Full Disk Encryption Software For Mac

  • Nov 06, 2018  Mac computers that have the Apple T2 Security Chip integrate security into both software and hardware to provide encrypted-storage capabilities. Data on the built-in, solid-state drive (SSD) is encrypted using a hardware-accelerated AES engine built into the T2 chip.
  • VeraCrypt (a successor to a discontinued TrueCrypt), an on-the-fly disk encryption software for Windows, Mac and Linux providing limited deniable encryption and to some extent (due to limitations on the number of hidden volumes which can be created) plausible deniability, without needing to be installed before use as long as the user has full.
Full read-write access granted!

Microsoft NTFS is one of the primary file systems of Windows. If you work on a Mac computer and need to read or write files from HDD, SSD or a flash drive formatted under Windows, you need Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software.

Store and share sensitive files securely with the latest in encryption software. Popular in mac Encryption Software. Get full tracking and interception protection.

Write, edit, copy, move and delete files on Microsoft NTFS volumes from your Mac! Fast, seamless, easy to use. Mount, unmount, verify, format or set any of your Microsoft NTFS volumes as a startup drive.

New! Supports macOS 10.15 (Catalina)

Write files to Microsoft NTFS drives on your Mac

Can’t write, copy, edit or delete files on Microsoft NTFS-formatted drives from your Mac? It’s because macOS has limited support for Windows volumes — that is, you can only read data, but can’t write or delete anything. Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software provides blazing fast, unlimited read/write access to Microsoft NTFS hard drives, SSDs or thumb drives formatted for Windows computers!

Best whole disk encryption software

  • Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software is a great upgrade to an exceptional cross-platform utility that’s easily worth the money, especially if you own the previous version 14, in which case this one’s free.
    The user interface is tastefully designed, with buttons for mounting, unmounting, verifying, or erasing the selected volume. Dual-boot users also have the option to reboot into a compatible mounted Mac or Windows startup volume. There’s even a lovely color-coded space indicator like the one introduced with Mac OS X El Capitan, displaying content by Audio, Video, Apps, Images, and Other categories.

    MacWorld, USA, August 2017,
    macworld.com

  • Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software, the excellent third-party file system driver that enables writing to Windows-formatted volumes at native speeds.

    MacWorld, USA, June 2017,
    macworld.com

  • Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software is the best such software solution: reliable, fast, and now affordable as well…
    Fast, seamless, and easy to use, Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software is required for those who need to write to Windows volumes. And now it’s more affordable than ever.

    MacWorld, USA 2016,
    macworld.com

  • A very specialized product that does its job in a very unobtrusive way. You just install it and it works. When you plug an NTFS disk into your Mac, it just mounts on the desktop like any other disk, and when you copy a file to it, it just works, no muss, no fuss. This utility is also invaluable if you find yourself in a situation where you need to format a disk as NTFS, and it performs this task with an equal lack of drama

    Apple Press, DVMUG

  • Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software is an essential installation for anyone working with Macs and PCs, as it helps to break down the barriers that exist between the two operating systems

    Mac World UK,
    macworld.com

  • It’ll install cleanly and easily on macOS 10.12 Sierra and “just work”, so it’s a good option

    How-to-Geek

  • Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software does exactly what we expect from it, by offering a seamless NTFS disk management. It’s good performances even allow working directly on the Windows partition, including for heavy applications such as video or photo processing.

    mac4ever.com

  • WOW….Ive been struggling with the whole MAC/Windows NTFS issue for some time and have a number of external drives that I need to swap between Mac/PC all the time. I’ve always had a headache with NTFS drivers etc. I bought and downloaded your Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software today and WOW. Amazing. Everything just works. Brilliant product. Worth every penny. Thank you.

    Robinson Philip

  • It is pretty fast with NTFS transfers (slightly slower than OSX extended partitions obviously) and I’ve never had any problems mid-transfer or anything. For me, it’s always done what it said on the box, and now with V14 it’s got El Capitan compatibility, so no complaints here. If you’re looking for a way to have plug-and-play NTFS drives on your mac, there really isn’t a better alternative to Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software. Highly recommended for all Mac users!

    M. Doyle

  • If you have a Mac and you need to access volumes that are formatted NTFS, this is the best solution out there. Why Apple hasn’t just baked in support for NTFS after all these years still remains a mystery. I’ve been using Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software for several years now and have never had any problems with it.

    H. Jaynes

Blazing Fast

Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software is up to six times faster than any of its closest commercial competitors!

Fully Compatible

Supports macOS Catalina
and older macOS
See Specifications

Powerful Features

Safe data transfer, hassle-free work, easy to use, seamless user experience

How it Works

Mac File Encryption

Simple as 1-2-3

Install

Download and install Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software onto your Mac.

Done!

Microsoft NTFS volumes connected to your Mac are available in the Finder.

All operations just a click away!

If you need more than just a blazing fast and reliable Microsoft NTFS driver, our lightweight menubar and full-featured Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software apps are always at your service.

Access all of your Microsoft NTFS drives and perform the most common volume operations like mount, unmount and verify.

Quickly restart your Mac in Windows from the menubar (assuming it’s installed on your mounted Microsoft NTFS drive).

Seamless User Experience

If you’ve ever used Apple’s Disk Utility, you already know how to use Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software. If you haven’t, it will only take a few moments to get acquainted.

Software

Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software takes the best of Apple’s Disk Utility and moves it to the next level, augmenting Microsoft NTFS volume operations and advanced mount options.

Mounting is entirely under your control with advanced options

Full Disk Encryption Software For Mac Download

Mount in Read-Only: select this option if you need to access sensitive data without modifying any files.

Do not mount automatically: select this option if you want to manually control access to a volume.

Outstanding performance at blazing fast speed

Microsoft NTFS for Mac by Paragon Software
is the fastest file system driver on the market:

6x times faster*

than competing solutions

*Tested on 2016 MacBook Pro with SSD drive, view benchmarks here.

Fresh review: check out the video review by European Motion Picture Association.

In cryptography and steganography, plausibly deniable encryption describes encryption techniques where the existence of an encrypted file or message is deniable in the sense that an adversary cannot prove that the plaintext data exists.[1]

The users may convincingly deny that a given piece of data is encrypted, or that they are able to decrypt a given piece of encrypted data,[citation needed] or that some specific encrypted data exists. Such denials may or may not be genuine. For example, it may be impossible to prove that the data is encrypted without the cooperation of the users. If the data is encrypted, the users genuinely may not be able to decrypt it. Deniable encryption serves to undermine an attacker's confidence either that data is encrypted, or that the person in possession of it can decrypt it and provide the associated plaintext.

Function[edit]

Deniable encryption makes it impossible to prove the existence of the plaintext message without the proper decryption key. This may be done by allowing an encrypted message to be decrypted to different sensible plaintexts, depending on the key used. This allows the sender to have plausible deniability if compelled to give up his or her encryption key.The notion of 'deniable encryption' was used by Julian Assange and Ralf Weinmann in the Rubberhose filesystem[2] and explored in detail in a paper by Ran Canetti, Cynthia Dwork, Moni Naor, and Rafail Ostrovsky[3] in 1996.

Scenario[edit]

Deniable encryption allows the sender of an encrypted message to deny sending that message. This requires a trusted third party. A possible scenario works like this:

  1. Bob suspects his wife Alice is engaged in adultery. That being the case, Alice wants to communicate with her secret lover Carl. She creates two keys, one intended to be kept secret, the other intended to be sacrificed. She passes the secret key (or both) to Carl.
  2. Alice constructs an innocuous message M1 for Carl (intended to be revealed to Bob in case of discovery) and an incriminating love letter M2 to Carl. She constructs a cipher-text C out of both messages, M1 and M2, and emails it to Carl.
  3. Carl uses his key to decrypt M2 (and possibly M1, in order to read the fake message, too).
  4. Bob finds out about the email to Carl, becomes suspicious and forces Alice to decrypt the message.
  5. Alice uses the sacrificial key and reveals the innocuous message M1 to Bob. Since it is impossible for Bob to know for sure that there might be other messages contained in C, he might assume that there are no other messages (alternatively, Bob may not be familiar with the concept of plausible encryption in the first place, and thus may not be aware it is even possible for C to contain more than one message).

Another possible scenario involves Alice sending the same ciphertext (some secret instructions) to Bob and Carl, to whom she has handed different keys. Bob and Carl are to receive different instructions and must not be able to read each other's instructions. Bob will receive the message first and then forward it to Carl.

  1. Alice constructs the ciphertext out of both messages, M1 and M2, and emails it to Bob.
  2. Bob uses his key to decrypt M1 and isn't able to read M2.
  3. Bob forwards the ciphertext to Carl.
  4. Carl uses his key to decrypt M2 and isn't able to read M1.

Forms of deniable encryption[edit]

Normally, ciphertexts decrypt to a single plaintext that is intended to be kept secret. However, one form of deniable encryption allows its users to decrypt the ciphertext to produce a different (innocuous but plausible) plaintext and plausibly claim that it is what they encrypted. The holder of the ciphertext will not be able to differentiate between the true plaintext, and the bogus-claim plaintext. In general, decrypting one ciphertext to multiple plaintexts is not possible unless the key is as large as the plaintext,[4] so this is not practical for most purposes.[5] However, some schemes allow decryption to decoy plaintexts that are close to the original in some metric (such as edit distance).[6]

Modern deniable encryption techniques exploit the fact that without the key, it is infeasible to distinguish between ciphertext from block ciphers and data generated by a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (the cipher's pseudorandom permutation properties).[7]

This is used in combination with some decoy data that the user would plausibly want to keep confidential that will be revealed to the attacker, claiming that this is all there is. This is a form of steganography.

It only works with Access 2003 files – it does not work with 2007 or higher. Mac add app to mic access on android. The only way to open Access 2007 files with MDBLite is to export them to 2003 format and convert that file instead.

If the user does not supply the correct key for the truly secret data, decrypting it will result in apparently random data, indistinguishable from not having stored any particular data there.

One example of deniable encryption is a cryptographic filesystem that employs a concept of abstract 'layers', where each layer can be decrypted with a different encryption key. Additionally, special 'chaff layers' are filled with random data in order to have plausible deniability of the existence of real layers and their encryption keys. The user can store decoy files on one or more layers while denying the existence of others, claiming that the rest of space is taken up by chaff layers. Physically, these types of filesystems are typically stored in a single directory consisting of equal-length files with filenames that are either randomized (in case they belong to chaff layers), or cryptographic hashes of strings identifying the blocks. The timestamps of these files are always randomized. Examples of this approach include Rubberhose filesystem and PhoneBookFS.

Another approach used by some conventional disk encryption software suites is creating a second encrypted volume within a container volume. The container volume is first formatted by filling it with encrypted random data,[8] and then initializing a filesystem on it. The user then fills some of the filesystem with legitimate, but plausible-looking decoy files that the user would seem to have an incentive to hide. Next, a new encrypted volume (the hidden volume) is allocated within the free space of the container filesystem which will be used for data the user actually wants to hide. Since an adversary cannot differentiate between encrypted data and the random data used to initialize the outer volume, this inner volume is now undetectable.LibreCrypt[9] and BestCrypt can have many hidden volumes in a container; TrueCrypt is limited to one hidden volume.[10]

Detection[edit]

The existence of hidden encrypted data may be revealed by flaws in the implementation.[11] It may also be revealed by a so-called 'watermarking attack' if an inappropriate cipher mode is used.[12]The existence of the data may be revealed by it 'leaking' into non-encrypted disk space [13] where it can be detected by forensic tools.[14]

Doubts have been raised about the level of plausible deniability in 'hidden volumes'[15] – the contents of the 'outer' container filesystem have to be 'frozen' in its initial state to prevent the user from corrupting the hidden volume (this can be detected from the access and modification timestamps), which could raise suspicion. This problem can be eliminated by instructing the system not to protect the hidden volume, although this could result in lost data.

Drawbacks[edit]

Deniable encryption has been criticized because it does not defend users from revealing keys under coercion or torture. Possession of deniable encryption tools could lead attackers to continue torturing a user even after the user has revealed all their keys, because the attackers could not know whether the user had revealed their last key or not.[16]

Deniable authentication[edit]

Some in-transit encrypted messaging suites, such as Off-the-Record Messaging, offer deniable authentication which gives the participants plausible deniability of their conversations. While deniable authentication is not technically 'deniable encryption' in that the encryption of the messages is not denied, its deniability refers to the inability of an adversary to prove that the participants had a conversation or said anything in particular.

This is achieved by the fact that all information necessary to forge messages is appended to the encrypted messages – if an adversary is able to create digitally authentic messages in a conversation (see hash-based message authentication code (HMAC)), he is also able to forge messages in the conversation. This is used in conjunction with perfect forward secrecy to assure that the compromise of encryption keys of individual messages does not compromise additional conversations or messages.

Software[edit]

  • OpenPuff, freeware semi-open-source steganography for MS Windows.
  • EDS, a mobile encryption app available on Android, includes plausible-deniability encryption.
  • Espionage, shareware for Mac OS X.[17] Source code is available to security researchers.[18]
  • Fuyoal, an open-source tool that provides plausible deniability based on indiscernibility between encrypted files which contain and do not contain hidden content.
  • LibreCrypt, opensourcetransparent disk encryption for MS Windows and PocketPC PDAs that provides both deniable encryption and plausible deniability.[8][19] Offers an extensive range of encryption options, and doesn't need to be installed before use as long as the user has administrator rights.
  • Off-the-Record Messaging, a cryptographic technique providing true deniability for instant messaging.
  • PhoneBookFS, another cryptographic filesystem for Linux, providing plausible deniability through chaff and layers. A FUSE implementation. No longer maintained.
  • Rubberhose, defunct project (last release in 2000, not compatible with modern Linux distributions)
  • StegFS, the current successor to the ideas embodied by the Rubberhose and PhoneBookFS filesystems
  • VeraCrypt (a successor to a discontinued TrueCrypt), an on-the-fly disk encryption software for Windows, Mac and Linux providing limited deniable encryption[20] and to some extent (due to limitations on the number of hidden volumes which can be created[10]) plausible deniability, without needing to be installed before use as long as the user has full administrator rights.
  • Vanish, a research prototype implementation of self-destructing data storage.
  • ScramDisk 4 Linux, a free software suite of tools, for GNU/Linux systems, which can open and create scramdisk and truecrypt container.

See also[edit]

  • Rubber-hose cryptanalysis – Extraction of cryptographic secrets by coercion or torture
  • Steganography – Art and science of writing hidden messages

References[edit]

  1. ^See http://www.schneier.com/paper-truecrypt-dfs.html. Retrieved on 2013-07-26.
  2. ^See 'Archived copy'. Archived from the original on 2010-09-15. Retrieved 2010-10-21.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link). Retrieved on 2009-07-22.
  3. ^Ran Canetti, Cynthia Dwork, Moni Naor, Rafail Ostrovsky (1996-05-10). 'Deniable Encryption'(PostScript). Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '97. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 1294. pp. 90–104. doi:10.1007/BFb0052229. ISBN978-3-540-63384-6. Retrieved 2007-01-05.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  4. ^https://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/ninghui/courses/555_Spring12/handouts/555_Spring12_topic03.pdf
  5. ^Smith (2007-06-09). 'One Time Pads'.
  6. ^Trachtenberg, Ari (March 2014). Say it Ain't So - An Implementation of Deniable Encryption(PDF). Blackhat Asia. Singapore.
  7. ^Chakraborty, Debrup; Rodríguez-Henríquez., Francisco (2008). Çetin Kaya Koç (ed.). Cryptographic Engineering. p. 340. ISBN9780387718170.
  8. ^ ab'LibreCrypt: Transparent on-the-fly disk encryption for Windows. LUKS compatible.: T-d-k/LibreCrypt'. 2019-02-09.
  9. ^'LibreCrypt documentation on Plausible Deniability'. 2019-02-09.
  10. ^ ab'TrueCrypt'.
  11. ^Adal Chiriliuc (2003-10-23). 'BestCrypt IV generation flaw'. Archived from the original on 2006-07-21. Retrieved 2006-08-23.Cite journal requires journal= (help)
  12. ^[title=https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2013-07/msg04229.html [Qemu-devel] QCOW2 cryptography and secure key handling]
  13. ^Encrypted hard drives may not be safe: Researchers find that encryption is not all it claims to be.
  14. ^http://www.forensicfocus.com/index.php?name=Forums&file=viewtopic&t=3970 Is there any way to tell in Encase if there is a hidden truecrypt volume? If so how?
  15. ^Plausible deniability support for LUKS
  16. ^Julian Assange: Physical Coercion
  17. ^Major Advancements in Deniable Encryption Arrive in Espionage 3.6
  18. ^Espionage 3 — Source Code Available to Security Professionals
  19. ^See its documentation section on 'Plausible Deniability')
  20. ^TrueCrypt - Free Open-Source On-The-Fly Disk Encryption Software for Windows Vista/XP, Mac OS X, and Linux - Hidden Volume

Further reading[edit]

Full Disk Encryption Software For Mac Free

  • Czeskis, A.; St. Hilaire, D. J.; Koscher, K.; Gribble, S. D.; Kohno, T.; Schneier, B. (2008). 'Defeating Encrypted and Deniable File Systems: TrueCrypt v5.1a and the Case of the Tattling OS and Applications'(PDF). 3rd Workshop on Hot Topics in Security. USENIX.
  • Howlader, Jaydeep; Basu, Saikat (2009). 'Sender-Side Public Key Deniable Encryption Scheme'. Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Recent Technologies in Communication and Computing. IEEE. doi:10.1109/ARTCom.2009.107.
  • Howlader, Jaydeep; Nair, Vivek; Basu, Saikat (2011). 'Deniable Encryption in Replacement of Untappable Channel to Prevent Coercion'. Proc. Advances in Networks and Communications. Communications in Computer and Information Science. 132. Springer. pp. 491–501. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17878-8_50.

Windows Full Disk Encryption Software

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